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Aspects of divergence in the Euro Area
Nicos Christodoulakis1, Athens University of Economics & Business
and Hellenic Observatory, LSE
Abstract 
T he paper examines how the convergence process between the less and the more developed members of the Euro Area weakened signifi cantly after the 
circulation of the common currency, and subsequently reversed course in the post-
crisis recession. The front-loaded consolidation programs that followed the bail-
outs in the over-indebted economies caused asymmetric losses in per capita in-
come in the peripheral countries and led to further North-South polarization. The 
paper identifi es public indebtedness, quality of institutions and capital formation 
as the areas where divergences are more pronounced and suggests that policy ini-
tiatives to encourage more investment and a faster institutional assimilation are 
needed for the convergence process in the Euro Area to take off again.
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Περίληψη
Η εργασία εξετάζει πώς η διαδικασία σύγκλισης μεταξύ των λιγότερο και πε-ρισσότερο ανεπτυγμένων οικονομιών της Ευρωζώνης εξασθένισε μετά την 
κυκλοφορία του κοινού νομίσματος και, εν συνεχεία, αντιστράφηκε σε απόκλιση 
μετά την κρίση χρέους. Η εμπροσθοβαρής δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή που συνό-
δευσε τα προγράμματα δανειακής διάσωσης στις υπερχρεωμένες χώρες προκάλεσε 
ασύμμετρες απώλειες εισοδήματος και μεγέθυνε το χάσμα Βορρά-Νότου στην Ευ-
ρωζώνη. Οι αποκλίσεις ανάμεσα στις δύο ομάδες χωρών που είναι έντονες αφορούν 
το δημόσιο χρέος, τις επενδύσεις και την ποιότητα λειτουργίας των θεσμών, συμπι-
έζοντας έτσι τη δυναμική της ανάπτυξης και υπονομεύοντας τη σύγκλιση. Για να 
ξαναπάρει μπροστά η διαδικασία σύγκλισης των χωρών της Ευρωζώνης, χρειάζο-
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νται νέες πολιτικές οι οποίες ευνοούν την αύξηση των επενδύσεων και προάγουν 
την ταχύτερη θεσμική προσαρμογή των κρατών-μελών.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Ευρωζώνη, Ανάπτυξη, Σύγκλιση
1. Introduction
T he aspirations of nations vying to join the European Union (EU) over the last half century were social, political and economic, albeit to a different 
extent for each new member. Mature western democracies, such as those of the 
United Kingdom or the Scandinavian countries sought to increase their involve-
ment in the post-war European making, though later some of them changed 
their minds and chose to break away. The countries of European South that 
lived through military dictatorships until mid-1970s as well as those of Eastern 
Europe that abolished communist rule in the early 1990s saw their accession to 
the EU as an anchor of socio-political freedoms, and a helping hand for setting 
up democratic institutions. After decades of domestic oppression and geopoliti-
cal isolation, they hoped of fully participating in the family of Western societies 
sharing similar values and opportunities. 
However, the Holy Grail of Governments, pressure groups and opinion mak-
ers in forging their people’s approval of EU membership was the process of con-
vergence towards the living standards of the older and more developed member-
states. The expectation was that -sooner rather than later- some kind of mystical 
dynamics would bring about more effi cient markets and macroeconomic stability 
ushering in to a new era of growth and prosperity for their citizens. The EU au-
thorities embraced these aspirations and since mid-1980s made the fi nancing of 
regional projects through the Community Support Frameworks (CSF) a central 
policy priority to foster growth in the less-developed areas. 
In mid-1990s, however, most EU economies were in a state of panic after 
abandoning the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the harsh monetary pol-
icy they had to follow in order to sustain the exchange rate targets. Naturally, 
policy priorities shifted toward seeking macroeconomic stability, and the need to 
create the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) subsequently attracted most 
of the political capital and legislative work of that period. Each member-state 
had to comply with a number of rules and limitations regarding the burden of 
public debt and defi cits, the infl ation rate, the exchange rate fl uctuations, and 
the cost of sovereign borrowing in world markets. It was only after achieving all 
criteria that a country could qualify for participating in the EMU and adopting 
the common currency. 
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It was clear that the emphasis given by both the EU authorities and na-
tional governments alike was to set up the EMU in time and by then secure the 
accession of as many member-states as possible. The new policy process was 
called -somewhat derogatorily- ‘nominal’ convergence as opposed to the ‘real’ 
convergence process involving households’ incomes. As the latter was no more a 
prerequisite either for a country to join the common currency or for its smooth 
functioning afterwards, its urgency started fading away from the policy agenda 
and was since then considered to be the ultimate (as opposed to imminent) pur-
suit of the EU. To reassure the signatory member-states that real convergence is 
not abandoned, the Maastricht Treaty pledged that “…the Community shall aim 
at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions”; 
see (EC, 1992, Article 130a). 
To that effect, the EU responded fi rst by extending the fi nancial resources 
allocated to the CSF it hoped to speed-up convergence in the least-developed 
regions, and, second, by announcing the Lisbon Strategy for Growth (LSG for 
short). With the latter, it hoped to revive market reforms and boost competitive-
ness and non-infl ationary growth. In practice, however, LSG lacked the fi nancial 
capacity to implement such ambitious policies, and not even enforced a major 
reallocation of CSF funds to support them. No wonder that fi nally it became 
nothing more than a reference framework.
At that time, policy makers could not possibly imagine the different mod-
els of economic development that prevailed across member-states according to 
whether capital fl ows were mainly allocated to internationally traded (as hap-
pened in the northern countries) or non-traded sectors (as in the southern part 
of the Euro Area). In the former case, competitiveness and external balances 
greatly improved, while in the latter they deteriorated, thus leading to serious 
post-EMU divergences within the Euro Area. The dominant theory of the time 
was that EMU would evolve smoothly to correct any remaining imbalances in 
the economic behavior of member-states, ranging from business cycles smooth-
ing (e.g. in Christodoulakis et al. 1993) to free factor mobility and equalization 
of wages (e.g. in Emerson et al. 1992). No doubt, at least the fi rst of the above 
expectations was duly accomplished: for example, González and Ruscher (2008) 
confi rm the synchronization of fl uctuations and imply that it forged the con-
fi dence of the viability of the common currency. Similarly, De Grauwe and Ji 
(2016), and Belke et al. (2016) conclude that business cycles have had become 
increasingly synchronized across Euro Area economies even after they were se-
verely hit by the global crisis.
But no comparable progress in closing the gap of post-EMU living stand-
ards has been noticed even before the global crisis. In fact, the Euro Area was 
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experiencing a slow deterioration of income gaps that became a lot more pro-
nounced in the aftermath of the debt crisis and the bailout programs imple-
mented in the weaker economies. As a result, social dissatisfaction towards 
the common currency -and the European institutions in general- would reach 
unprecedented levels before a new policy interest in bridging the asymmetries 
started to emerge in policy debates. 
In the literature, there are two measures of income convergence: one is the 
so-called β-convergence, which tests whether countries with an initially lower 
GDP per capita subsequently, grow indeed faster than countries with a higher 
initial level, thus giving rise to the “catching up” effect. The other is the so-called 
σ-convergence, which measures the decline in dispersion of GDP per capita 
among fellow member-countries. In a study for the initial 12-member group of 
the Euro Area (henceforth EA12), Christodoulakis (2009) employed both conver-
gence indicators to show that the gap had in fact widened, albeit to an extent 
that at that time seemed to be reversible if certain policies were implemented. 
Such corrective action, however, was never implemented at a scale suffi cient 
for the convergence process to appear again. Hence, the catching-up effect ceased 
and the gap between less and more developed nations further widened after the 
global fi nancial crisis in 2008. According to Diaz et al. (2017), it is striking that 
so little convergence has occurred among the early euro adopters, despite their 
differences in GDP per capita at the beginning of the period. In contrast to some 
optimistic expectations that the establishment of the euro would itself act as a 
catalyst for faster real convergence, they fi nd that little convergence, if any at 
all, has taken place for the whole period 1999-2016. In a more updated study, 
Cabrillac (2019) examines both measures of convergence and fi nds that improve-
ment among EU members has slowed down during the recent period if compared 
to the two prior decades. 
It was only after the global crisis and the socio-economic cracks that ap-
peared in recession-hit countries that policy makers started again appreciating 
convergence of living standards as an important pillar in the EMU foundation 
and longevity. No less than ECB (2015), openly admitted that ‘little real con-
vergence has taken place among the euro area economies since the establish-
ment of the euro, despite initial expectations that the single currency would 
act as a catalyst for faster real convergence’. Further on, the ECB report sug-
gested that ‘sustainable real convergence supports the smooth functioning of 
Monetary Union over the medium term’, and the Commission followed suit by 
emphasizing that ‘progress on economic convergence is of particular relevance 
for the functioning of the euro area but is equally important for the EU as a 
whole’; see (EC, 2017). 
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In the same Report it is found that ‘[t]]he convergence trends of the single 
currency’s fi rst years have proven partly illusory’, the Report calls for swift and 
effective action to achieve ‘strong economic and social re-convergence’. Academic 
research responded with a strong voice in favour of more real convergence. For 
example, spirit, Diaz et al. (2017) argue that achieving economic convergence is 
a crucial condition for sustainability of Euro Area membership. More emphati-
cally, Franks et al. (2018) remind all competent authorities that convergence 
of per capita income levels is an important objective of the economic integration 
process; (my italics). More recently, Imbs and Pauwels (2019), examined why 
EMU failed to generate convergence in per capita GDP terms and suggest that 
the best way to achieve that is by pushing EMU to become an optimal currency 
area ex post, even though it had not been one ex ante.
The aim of the present paper is to examine the gradual erosion of the con-
vergence process since before the establishment of EMU in the late 1990s to the 
post-crisis years. In this context, it shows that major external imbalances that 
characterized the Euro Area economies in the post-EMU period led the most-
exposed countries to the sudden-stop crises and necessitated the bailout agree-
ments. The recession that followed exacerbated several inherent weaknesses 
and further widened the gap in living standards between the most developed 
countries of the Euro Area and the peripheral economies. 
Investigating the areas where post-crisis discrepancies are more pronounced, 
the paper focuses on the issues of public indebtedness, the fall in investment 
activity and the delay -if not outright reversal- in improving institutions. In all 
three areas, the Southern economies of the Euro Area are found to starkly devi-
ate from their Northern peers. The new member-states that joined the EU in 
2003 and EMU a few years later appear to follow a more satisfactory process of 
convergence, though gaps in some critical areas continue to persist. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how the con-
vergence process was set in motion in the run-up to EMU but was then gradually 
extinguished and replaced by strong disparities after the global crisis. Section 
3 discusses the main areas in which divergences appear to be stronger, leading 
to a further polarization between Northern and Southern members of the Euro 
Area. Section 4 examines some key aspects of polarization and proposes a num-
ber of policies to mitigate discrepancies. Finally, Section 5 concludes with some 
suggestions for future research. 
2. From convergence to divergence
W e start by examining a simple measure of dispersion in per capita incomes among member-states. Fig. 1a plots the band of one standard deviation 
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around the mean of per capita GDP in real terms during the period 1986-2018. 
Calculations involve only the initial group joining the Euro Area to avoid pos-
sible idiosyncrasies in the countries that were not full members of the EU for the 
whole period. By further excluding Luxembourg as a high-income outlier, the 
group remains with eleven member states, (henceforth EA11). The growing gap 
in living standards becomes evident by observing that one standard deviation 
reached €13,538 in 2018, more than twice wider than the amount of €5,775 in the 
beginning of the EMU in 1986.2 
In Fig. 1b, another measure of dispersion is depicted by plotting the gap be-
tween the maximum and minimum levels of per capita incomes among member-
states relative to their mean. Before EMU, relative dispersion had fallen from 
56% in 1986 to 49% in 1998, though it slightly rose afterwards to reach 52% 
in 2009. After the global fi nancial crisis, it sharply widened reaching 76% of 
the mean in 2018. These fi ndings imply that the convergence process between 
the less and the more developed initial members of the Euro Area signifi cantly 
weakened in the post-EMU era and reversed course during the previous decade. 
2.1 Convergence before the EMU
The well-known test for β-convergence over a certain period is to look for a 
strong, signifi cant and negative correlation of cumulative growth versus the per 
capita GDP in the beginning of the time-span. The result depicted in Fig. 2a for 
the eleven Euro Area group (i.e. still excluding Luxembourg) in the pre-EMU 
phase 1986-1997, reveals a negative and statistically signifi cant relationship. 
The implication is that the gap between poorer and richer members was clearly 
diminishing during that period, thus generating a strong catching-up effect. 
The gap was reduced for both bad and good reasons: In late 1980s and early 
1990s, several advanced economies were still trapped in the legacy of stagfl ation 
or experiencing painful currency appreciations in their struggle to survive in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the EMU’s precursor. As some of the less 
developed countries had remained thus far outside ERM, they enjoyed a more 
fl exible monetary policy and higher growth.
On the positive side, the EU had endorsed a whole set of growth-inducing 
policies to promote development in the less-advanced regions – from fi nancing 
new investment to upgrading human skills and supporting renovation and real-
location projects. Under the umbrella of the Community Support Framework 
(CSF), initiatives to build modern infrastructures, upgrade human capital, and 
support new productive investment reached such a scale that it fi nally succeeded 
in removing pockets of poverty and creating several local champions of competi-
tiveness, exports and employment. 
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A framework of ex post evaluation attached to the CSF funding helped into 
further expanding the growth momentum. As a way of creating incentives for 
project effi ciency, the eligibility as well as the level and the disbursement of 
regional funds were made conditional on the actual improvement of living condi-
tions in the specifi c areas. In case of successful projects, conditionality sparked a 
virtuous cycle of income growth and project fi nancing. On the other hand, failing 
to meet the criteria was likely to lead to the discontinuation of project funding, 
thus causing plenty of political embarrassment to national and local authorities. 
Fig. 1. Dispersion of per capita income in EA11
Note: Dispersion in (a) is set to one std around the mean. In (b) the gap is the difference 
between maximum and minimum levels across EA11 countries relative to the mean. Data 
source: Ameco
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2.2 No convergence post-EMU
T he early optimism that prevailed in the 1990s was stretched to the limits by claiming that the establishment of a common currency would automatically 
catalyze factor mobility between member-states. New investment expected to 
freely fl ow to the least-developed economies to exploit higher returns on capital, 
while labour was likely to move to the most-developed economies to benefi t from 
better wage remuneration and more effi cient job markets. Therefore, the gap in 
per capita living standards would further diminish by the self-correcting process 
of factor-returns equalization. In practice, however, no worth mentioning corre-
lation is even detected between overall growth during 1997-2007 and per capita 
levels at the beginning of that period. The relevant test fails to establish any 
catching-up effect, as clearly shown in Fig. 2b.
The lack of post-EMU convergence should not, however, be attributed to the 
absence of policy targets. In fact, a long list of actions and reforms known as the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth (LSG) had already put in circulation since 2000; see 
EC (2000). The LSG framework aimed at making the European Union ‘the most 
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world’, by improving 
competitiveness to achieve sustainable economic growth, more and better jobs, 
greater social cohesion, respect for the environment, and a leap in educational 
attainment and technological innovation. All those became catch phrases for all 
post-EMU policy proclamations, albeit to only a limited practical effect. 
The fact that the LSG failed in the post-EMU era was not due to the lack 
of ambition as to that of political will to confront the new challenges. Soon after 
its launch, it became evident that the complexity of goals and the lack of strong 
incentives or clear-cut national obligations in the implementation of LSG would 
soon make the whole effort to end up in a deadlock. The absence of enforcement 
mechanisms and the lack of appropriate fi nancing -at least to the scale actually 
required-, fi nally made them look as only tentative inspirations rather than rig-
orously pursued policy targets. A new strategy drafted in 2005 put more focus on 
the simplifi cation and national ownership via national action plans as the key 
elements to revitalize the reforms agenda. Nevertheless, as the global crisis was 
approaching, the Lisbon strategy again stayed below expectations and failed to 
steer the EU towards more growth and resilience; for a thorough critique see 
Wyplosz (2010). The LSG fi nally was declared obsolete and, in March 2010, sub-
sequently superseded by a new framework for ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’; see EC (2010). It was unfortunate that only a month after its launch, 
the debt-crisis erupted in the Euro Area periphery and its shockwaves hit con-
vergence for yet another time.
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Fig. 2: From convergence to divergence in EA11
Data source: Ameco
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2.3 Post-crisis divergence
Although all of the EA economies suffered serious losses in households’ incomes 
after the crisis in 2008, some countries were further subjected to the contingen-
cies of bailout programs. The recipient countries agreed on implementing front-
loaded fi scal consolidations to restore public balances, and extensive wage-cuts 
to effectively achieve an internal devaluation and restore competitiveness. In 
turn, this caused further recession and divergence among the EA11 became even 
more pronounced, with Greece being the most severe case throughout. According 
to Estrada et al. (2013), for most of them the result was ‘a reversal of fortunes’, 
as several economies with better, on average, performance up to 2007 have sub-
sequently experienced deeper recessions and larger increases in unemployment 
rates. 
Figure 2c displays the pattern in the post-crisis period 2008-2018 for the 
EA11 member-countries. The relationship between cumulative growth in per 
capital income and its initial level has actually turned positive, suggesting that 
a process of divergence is clearly under way. An interesting exemption was Ire-
land, where the economy initially fell but subsequently embarked on a trajectory 
of superfast growth after 2014. 
2.4 We are all a family now
The extent of divergence is somewhat mitigated by including the seven new ac-
cession countries that joined the EU in 2003 and adopted the common currency a 
while later. Fig. 3 juxtaposes cumulative growth over the period 2004-2018 with 
initial per capita GDP for the group EA18, (i.e. again excluding outlier Luxem-
bourg). The straight line is statistically signifi cant and implies that a negative 
correlation is established. As a matter of fact, the new EA members followed a 
strong catching-up process, managing to close the huge gap that existed before. 
Optimism, however, is mitigated by noting that the impressive growth charac-
terizing the new joiners only took place in the years prior to the global crisis. 
Post-crisis, growth slowed down in them too and their convergence weakened as 
explained by Franks et al. (2018). 
The fact that most of Euro Area convergence is due to Eastern European 
countries is also confi rmed by Cabrillac (2019), who notes that otherwise con-
vergence actually stopped among EU countries and regions after the crisis. This 
prompts a closer inspection of the scattered plot in Fig. 3. By employing a para-
bolic relationship, a far better fi t is obtained and reveals that there probably 
exist more than one different growth patterns among the Euro Area economies. 
One pattern appears in the rising part of the curve that includes the most-
developed countries of the Euro Area. It shows a clear tendency of divergence in 
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per capita incomes, confi rming the fi ndings in the previous subsection. The fall-
ing part on the left-hand side of the curve includes the new EA members togeth-
er with those in the European South that experienced very low (or even negative) 
growth over the period in examination. The only convergence process currently 
in force in the Euro Area is the one between the less-developed new members 
with the crisis-stricken and relatively poorer members of the Euro Area. Hardly 
reminiscent of the aspirations held back in the roaring 1990s.
Fig. 3: Convergence in EA18, (excl. Luxembourg)
Note: All statistics are in favor of the parabolic (versus the linear) fi tting and include: DW=1.85 
(1.21), F-stat= 54.2 (7.3) and S.E.R.= 11.62 (26.74), Nobs=18. Data source: Ameco
3. New asymmetries 
T he most diverging performance among the Euro Area economies emerged in their external balances. Several countries saw their current account defi cits 
to go explosive, while at the same time others were building-up surpluses. For 
the Euro Area as a whole, the current account was virtually in balance without 
alerting policy makers to the internal gap and the risks associated with it. Ini-
tially, European authorities and policy analysts misperceived the asymmetric 
developments in the external balances as being only a transitional character-
istic. As such, it would soon dissipate without any specifi c action undertaken, 
although a traditional correction of competitiveness through exchange rate ad-
justment was no longer possible. Productivity alignments could possibly be car-
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ried out by enforcing new reforms in wage setting and labour markets, but that 
seemed hard to implement in the post-EMU years. A kind of policy fatigue was 
reigning in after the years of nominal convergence, and thus external asym-
metries continued to grow unchecked. 
3.1 Grow now, converge later
Furthermore, there was massive capital movement from Europe’s core—mainly 
Germany, but also the Netherlands—to its periphery. According to Krugman 
(2012), these fl ows led to an economic boom in the periphery after the creation 
of the euro and signifi cantly higher infl ation rates in Spain, Greece, and other 
periphery countries, than in Germany. Prior to the crisis, the successful macro-
economic adjustment to the EMU requirements and the lower interest rates that 
prevailed afterwards had led to a post-EMU optimism in self-enforcing adjust-
ments. Since national governments could borrow at a much lower cost than be-
fore, the expectation was that some kind of crowding-in would enable the private 
sector to fi nance more investment projects, while the public investment budget 
could also expand to fi nance modern infrastructure and, thus, enhance the sup-
ply-side capacity of the economy. In several countries, however, the increased 
availability of funds merely augmented aggregate demand, and soon led to large 
external imbalances. 
According to some authors, the seeds of imbalances were already planted 
long before the EMU started to take place. For example, Grjebine et al. (2019) 
note that real divergence increased from the early 1990s as evidenced by low pro-
ductivity growth in the «periphery» of the Euro area relative to «core» countries. 
They conclude that the creation of EMU in 1999 was far from being a catalyst 
for real convergence in Europe, because capital allocations across various sec-
tors followed widely diverging patterns and led to very different developments in 
their total factor productivity (TFP).
Although capital fl ows increased all over the Euro Area, there was a strong 
differentiation in the type and the allocation of investment across different coun-
tries. Christodoulakis and Sarantides (2017) developed a theoretical framework 
predicting that if an economy is relatively capital-intensive in the production of 
traded-goods, foreign direct investment (FDI) is more likely to fl ow in greater 
proportions to the traded sector, thus improving the trade balance of that par-
ticular economy. In contrast, economies with relatively dominant service sec-
tors are more likely to attract FDI there, eventually crowding-out production of 
traded goods and causing deterioration in the external account. By subsequently 
estimating the model across the Euro area countries over the period 1980-2009, 
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the authors established that a growing divergence was under way in the Euro 
Area long before the eruption of the global crisis.
In fact, the majority of new investment in the northern EA countries went 
to manufacturing and/or other productive sectors, while southern countries be-
came preferred destinations for real-estate development and the service sectors 
in general. Sooner rather than later, it was evident that northern countries ac-
quired a competitive edge over their southern neighbors and the gap in the re-
spective current accounts further widened. As a result, the northern group of 
countries managed to have export-oriented growth, while most of the southern 
economies plunged into real-estate bubbles and vastly increased their depend-
ency on imports. Soon, their fortunes were to change course.
3.2 The reversal of fortunes
In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, the group of countries most exposed 
to external defi cits were also those, which suffered more hardly from the lack 
of global liquidity. As described by Krugman (2012), when private capital fl ows 
from the core to the periphery came to a sudden stop, leaving the peripheral 
economies with prices and unit labor costs that were well out of line with those 
in the core, suddenly, the euro faced a major adjustment problem. Fig. 4 displays 
the current accounts of the Euro Area, by distinguishing between Northern, 
Southern and newly joining economies. 
It is revealing to see that all countries seeking some kind of bailout agree-
ments after 2010 had already experienced a huge deterioration in their current 
account defi cits. Greece, Portugal and Ireland asked for bailout agreements with 
the European authorities and the IMF in 2010. Spain had to bail out the fi nan-
cial sector and adopted a similar adjustment program in 2012, albeit excluding 
IMF’s participation. Italy, with a lower external imbalance, pointedly has kept 
on the verge until today.3 The eventuality of some of them exiting the Euro was 
fi nally avoided, but only after the Euro Area authorities in coordination with 
the IMF organized massive capital injections. To enhance competitiveness while 
keeping the common monetary policy intact, each of the bailout countries had to 
implement extensive austerity programs combined with an internal devaluation 
process of wage-cutting and the removal of many labour market protections. 
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Fig. 4: External balances in the EA19
Note: In the vertical axis, country acronyms. Data source: IMF WEO database. 
A similar crisis and consolidation pattern took place in the countries that 
joined the EU after 2003 and became members of the Euro Area a few years 
later.4 All those plunged into recession in the event of the global crisis: The Bal-
tic countries with large external defi cits were the fi rst to suffer from the global 
shrinkage of liquidity at the end of 2008. According to Blanchard (2013) the col-
lapse occurred in a sequential pattern with the crisis leading to a sudden stop, 
a credit crunch, a sharp drop in exports, and fi nally widespread uncertainty 
dominating the economy. Estonia experienced a major recession with GDP fall-
ing by -14% in 2008 and subsequently underwent a harsh adjustment program. 
Next was Latvia with a fall in GDP by -18% in 2009 and then following a front-
loaded fi scal consolidation to cut aggregate demand, while internal devaluation 
managed to lower wages and boost exports. Lithuania had a fall in GDP by -17% 
in 2009 and after following a similar adjustment program became a Euro mem-
perifereia t.9o.indd   22 15/6/2020   1:18:00 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:24 |
REGION & PERIPHERY [23]
ber in 2015. Cyprus initially had a small reduction in economic activity but the 
continuing external imbalances and a banking crisis that fi nally erupted in 2013 
drove the economy off the rails and forced the government to seek a bailout too; 
for details see Clerides (2017) 
The other countries with less explosive external imbalances experienced ei-
ther milder or shorter recessions, thus avoiding harsh consolidation program. 
Slovakia had just entered the EA when it was hit by recession in 2009-2010 but 
subsequently recovered; see Biea (2015). Slovenia with a comparatively smaller 
external defi cit suffered a somewhat milder recession with the GDP falling by 
-8% in 2009. However, a banking crisis later on dragged its economy further 
down until 2013, before a gradual revival took place. Malta virtually escaped the 
crisis, by experiencing only a small and short-lived contraction of GDP by -2.5% 
in 2009, after which it returned to uninterrupted growth. Apart from its tiny 
size, a reason for the Maltese economy remaining relatively shielded from global 
recession might have been that it decisively cut the external defi cit just before 
the crisis erupted. 
3.3 Spotting the weaker parts
The asymmetric developments in external positions revealed that a clear pattern 
of a North-South divide was set in motion before the crisis, rekindling the debate 
on the core-periphery gap and the claim that ‘a single currency cannot fi t them 
all’. However, before jumping to arguments questioning the viability of the Euro, 
it is useful to check whether and how this pattern differentiated across countries 
during and after the crisis. Attention again is restricted to the initial 12-member 
group (including Greece), as the seven new EA countries joined the common cur-
rency between 2007 and 2015, either too close or after the global crisis. 
The examination takes place by looking at how the dispersion among the 
Euro Area of some variables that typically are expected to affect growth and 
convergence. The variables of concern are similar to those included in the 
standard framework developed by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 12), and 
a comparison is displayed in Fig. 5 for three-time spans to cover the periods 
before, during and after the crisis. The graph shows that intra-EA deviations in 
per capita income initially widened only slightly during the crisis as countries 
suffered more or less symmetrically from the global recession. However, they 
were wildly exacerbated afterwards due to the different policies that applied to 
stave off recession and fueled the strong divergence dynamics mentioned in the 
previous section. The rest of the variables are exhibiting a mixed pattern that 
refl ects the contradictory effects of stabilization measures on income growth as 
discussed below. 
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First, it is noticeable that cross-country deviations in the current accounts 
were seriously contained after the crisis, thus weakening the mechanism through 
which a troubled economy was suffocated by the international credit crunch. 
However, most of external balance in the bailout countries were a consequence of 
the austerity programs, rather than a result of some structural transformation 
of their economies. As Catao (2017) notes an important segment of structural 
reforms in southern countries and Ireland has taken the form of public sector 
streamlining that is expected to harness the external imbalances even if some 
cyclical correction takes place in the future.
Fig. 5: Comparing EA12 deviations before, during and after the crisis
Note: Standard deviation is calculated on data where per capita (pc) GDP is in levels, fl ow 
variables are in percent of GDP; institutions are indexed; education is expressed in population 
shares of 18-65 years attained secondary schools; and growth rates (gr) are in percent. All 12 
members of the initial EA group are included. Data Source: Ameco, World Bank.
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In this vein, the curtailment of imports was mainly due to the shrinkage of 
total demand, brought about by higher taxes and cuts in public expenditures. 
These are compatible with the reduction of deviations in Government balances 
and the increase in those of taxation. Moreover, the internal devaluation process 
of wage-cuts contained the asymmetric rises in unit labour costs as seen by the 
lower deviation in the post-crisis period. As noted by Fernandes (2019, p 25), real 
wages had to fall to restore competitiveness and this led to further wage diver-
gence or no convergence between Southern and Northern euro area countries. 
But there was a further price to be paid for the bailout adjustments: several 
banks’ recapitalizations had to be fi nanced by issuing new public debt, thus aug-
menting deviations in indebtedness between EA12 economies. Public investment 
expenditures were trimmed down by fi scal austerity in bailout countries, while 
private investment fell dramatically due to lower demand and liquidity short-
ages. The rise in deviations of net investments after the crisis, underlines the 
high asymmetries in capital accumulation that may further delay convergence 
in the future. Adding insult to injury, the intensifying social protests against 
front-loaded stabilization policies frequently weakened the political system and 
undermined the overall effi ciency of institutions, as indicated by a substantial 
increase in the intra-EA deviations. Against all the above growth-cutting poli-
cies, the slight containment of deviations in education attainment or in TFP 
were not suffi cient to alter the picture.
As deviations between North and South continue to be pronounced in key 
areas after the crisis, it is likely that new diverging patterns might emerge in 
the future. Below,  the cases of public indebtedness, institutions and investment 
activity with high post-crisis deviations are further elaborated. 
4. Aspects of North-South polarization
I n this Section, we examine the developments in public indebtedness, invest-ment activity, and institutional capacity that prevailed in the Northern and 
Southern members of the Euro Area. To caution for the possibility of Greece driv-
ing the Southern average, the graphs are displayed with and without including 
it. The group of the new seven countries is also displayed. Figure 6 shows the 
three group-averages. 
4.1 Public indebtedness
In the aftermath of the global crisis, public debt rose in most economies of 
the Euro Area for a variety of reasons: in the fi rst phase, governments were en-
gaged in Keynesian expansionary policies to support aggregate demand in the 
face of the incoming recession. With tax revenues falling due to slack economic 
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activity and borrowing costs going up as a result of fi nancial collapse worldwide, 
public defi cits widened at a scale hitherto unseen for the Euro Area. 
The second phase included a wave of banks’ capitalizations by issuing public 
debt in order to compensate for the losses in their balance sheets due to investing 
in toxic assets overseas. As some governments in the Euro Area periphery were 
at the same time facing enormous borrowing requirements, they sought bailout 
agreements with European authorities and the IMF. 
As bailout agreements imposed austerity programs to control defi cits, they 
subsequently caused further recession and public debts spiraled as a proportion 
to GDP. Finally, the stock of debt expanded to cover the needs of banks’ recapi-
talizations. Overall, all of the southern countries are characterized by a degree 
of indebtedness considerably higher than ever before; see Fig. 6a.
Fig. 6: New divergences in the Euro Area
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Note: WBGI is in levels. Country-group averages. Dotted lines include Greece with the other 
three southern countries. Data source: Ameco, World Bank.
4.2 Public institutions
The most surprising fi nding, however, regards the growing discrepancies in the 
effi cacy of institutions in the member states. Although institutional assimilation 
is by no means a process with specifi c targets and convergence requirements, it 
was natural to assume that increasing factor mobility and policy coordination 
during the run-up to EMU would rather smooth down idiosyncratic differences 
than amplifying them. 
To visualize the process, we use the six governance indicators published 
by the World Bank (WBGI, for short) at an annual frequency and including the 
following:
1. Voice and accountability – capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting and assessing their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, association, and press media. 
2. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism – capturing perceptions 
of the likelihood that the political system will survive in the face of fragile 
governments, partisan challenges, an eventual power vacuum or extensive 
protests, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government effectiveness – capturing perceptions about the quality of 
public goods and services, the readiness of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of government’s commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory quality – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector activities and developments. 
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5. Rule of law – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confi dence in, and abide by, the rules of society and, in particular, the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the functioning of courts, as 
well as the frequency and intensity of crime and violence. 
6. Control of corruption – capturing perceptions of how effectively malpractices 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption are checked, as well as 
avoiding the ‘capturing’ of the state by elites and private interests.
According to Kaufmann et al. (2011), the fi rst two indicators qualify the process 
by which governments are selected and monitored; the next two, measure the 
capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
the fi nal two show the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions. 
To simplify the analysis, a principal components analysis is performed in or-
der to obtain a weighted average of the above WBGI indicators for each country; 
see Christodoulakis (2019) for more econometric details. Subsequently, Fig. 6b 
displays how the country-group average evolved over the last twenty years. It 
is remarkable that the newly joined group improved institutions in accordance 
with stronger performance in GDP growth, thus speeding up convergence to the 
Euro Area peers. In contrast, the Southern countries suffered a pronounced de-
terioration in institutional capacity right after the circulation of the common 
currency, and continued unabated after the crisis. 
The discrepancy in the institutional performance might -at least partly- ex-
plain the divergence in income growth, as has been debated in the economic 
literature for a long time (for a survey on the subject see Acemoglou et al. (2005), 
and Algan & Cahuc (2014), among many others. For the effect on European 
growth, see MacFarlan et al. (2013), Masuch et al. (2016), and Christodoulakis 
(2019), among many others). 
As noted by Loon (2018), the importance of the structural/institutional as-
pect in the convergence process is often either neglected or purposefully avoided. 
To overcome the present impasse in convergence, a refocusing on structural and 
institutional indicators would aid in furthering the debate and, thus, strengthen 
the resilience of the EMU. The fi nding is in agreement with Eichengreen (2019), 
who notes that the change in the dynamics of convergence of TFP and per capita 
GDP before and after the global fi nancial crisis underscores the fact that the 
problem is not just a legacy of the global fi nancial crisis but, as he puts it, is fun-
damentally a crisis of institutions.
4.3 Investment activity
Investment activity appears to be strongly diverging in the Euro Area both be-
fore and after the global crisis, albeit for different reasons. Before the crisis, the 
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Southern Euro Area economies were investing in aggregate new fi xed capital 
formation at an intensity consistently higher than that of their northern peers, 
as shown in Fig. 6c.
Obviously, this resulted to higher growth in per capita incomes and contrib-
uted to somewhat closing the gap with the most affl uent countries as examined 
in section 2.2. Investments in the European South were predominantly chan-
neled to real-estate and the non-tradable sectors in general, in contrast with the 
mostly productive investment in tradable sectors that was taking place in the 
Northern countries. An unpleasant consequence of these developments was that 
exports were boosted only in the North leading to a more robust growth, while 
external balances in the South hugely deteriorated leading to the bailouts and 
the prolonged austerity programs.
In the aftermath of the crisis, fi xed investment declined in all countries with 
adverse consequences everywhere. The growth prospects of the Euro Area were 
starkly diminished by under-investment as described by Kolev et al. (2013), Bar-
di et al. (2014), Gornig and Schiersch (2014), among many others. Christodou-
lakis and Axioglou (2017) note that the overall response in the EA was sluggish 
and lagging behind the competitor economies, like the US or even Japan, where 
aggregate investment -after an initial slump- started quickly recovering. By es-
timating a neoclassical economic model, they show that underinvestment is the 
main factor behind unemployment and slow growth witnessed in the Euro Area 
ever since. 
Even more alarming, however, has been the vast disinvestment that has 
taken place over the recent years in the peripheral economies. For example, 
investment in the real-estate sector plunged everywhere though its impact on 
overall investment was greater in the South, due to the higher share it had be-
fore the crisis. Further on, private sector savings in those countries were severe-
ly hit by direct wage cuts and increased taxation, as conditioned by the austerity 
programs. Moreover, governments were cutting back public investments as a 
politically easier way to trim defi cits than by further raising taxes. These policies 
generated new post-crisis asymmetries in net fi xed investment profi les, wider 
and more threatening than before. The northern Euro Area countries managed, 
after an initial drop in 2009-2010, to keep an average of 4% of GDP, while those 
in the South experienced a devastating fall. The intensity is so low after the cri-
sis that it practically amounts to abstaining from new investment activity. Some 
marginal rekindling of investment appeared in 2017, though it again disappears 
if Greece is taken into account.
Regarding the newly joined economies, they naturally experienced a much 
more volatile pattern before the crisis in their way to remove the rigidities of 
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state-planning and make room for modern dynamic market economies. In the 
prospect of becoming full members of the European Union in 2003, gross invest-
ment peaked and continued at even higher rates afterwards approaching 14% 
of their GDP in average in 2007. Post-crisis, however, investment activity also 
collapsed by more than 10% of GDP per year in average before reaching levels 
close to those followed in the northern Euro Area group. 
4.4 Resolving the puzzle
The aforementioned analysis invites a debate on how each one of the three as-
pects characterizing the North-South divide could improve by specifi c actions. 
The situation, however, is more perplexing since the three characteristics are 
not autonomous but seem to affect -or being affected by- the other. For example, 
a deterioration in the effi cacy of institutions deters new investment, thus halting 
growth and fi nally augmenting public debt as a proportion to GDP. High indebt-
edness is by itself a deterrent to new investment, while the positive feedback 
loop of underinvestment, recession and unemployment strains social coherence 
and undermines the institutional capacity of the country. Pierluigi and Sonder-
mann (2018) argue that high levels of debt make economies more vulnerable to 
adverse shocks. For that reason, they suggest a higher GDP growth that would 
also help debt sustainability, which can be achieved by fostering the implemen-
tation of structural reforms.
The question then is how all the above aspects could start simultaneously 
moving in the right direction. Currently, there are some public debates to ease 
the burden of indebtedness in the most stressed countries of the Euro Area, 
either by reducing and further reprofi ling debt repayments as in the case of 
Greece and possibly Italy in the near future, or by designing some kind of debt 
mutualization at the Euro Area level. As all such measures will eventually mate-
rialize - either directly or indirectly - at the expense of other member-states with 
currently lower debt burdens, it seems unlikely that they become popular issues 
to be easily adopted in the near future.
On the other hand, improving institutions by enacting market reforms and 
applying best practices seems to be promising for catalyzing new investment 
and fostering growth without burdening other member states. However, policy 
lags are important and it may take some time before the private sector reacts 
to an improved institutional framework. Especially for the countries exiting the 
long tunnel of consolidation programs, enacting radical market reforms may 
face a wave of socio-political resistance reminiscing of the post-EMU fatigue as 
mentioned earlier. 
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This leaves the option of enhancing investment activity as the most realistic 
in political terms and promptly delivering in economic terms. Describing the mul-
tiple effects that investment could have had on the Euro Area, Della Posta et al. 
(2019) underline the fact that in some peripheral Eurozone countries, aggregate 
demand and investment (especially public investment) are far from having recov-
ered, thus explaining why they continue to have sluggish growth and fall away 
from their peers. To overcome this, they suggest a grand investment plan capable 
to stimulate both current and medium-term GDP growth. Moreover, it will defi -
nitely contribute to the stabilization of public debt as a ratio of GDP and might 
even help in the restoration of a pro-European sentiment in those countries.
However, underinvestment has been so vast in the recent past that even 
such an ambitious plan may not be enough. Barkbu et al. (2015) found that the 
shortfall in investment not explained by recession amounts to 3-6% of GDP, and 
suggest that to overcome the problem a ‘complementary policy action at both the 
national and the euro area levels’ is needed in order to speed up investment in 
the non-residential sectors. 
Arguments for raising, innovating and transforming productive capital and 
infrastructures in the Euro Area are becoming overwhelming. The investment 
initiative known as the ‘Juncker Plan’ helped to launch a number of major invest-
ment projects in post-crisis economies, though the amount of funds were clearly 
far below the critical mass needed to make them change course and embark on a 
sustained growth path. To strengthen the process, Fernandes (2019, p. 21) sug-
gests to adopt the recommendation made by the European Trade Union Confed-
eration for the establishment of a European Treasury for public investment. 
Even the central bank’s zeitgeist seemed to be more radical nowadays, as 
the new president of ECB took the unparalleled step to invite Germany and the 
Netherlands to use their fi scal surpluses in order to spur investment and boost 
growth both at home and in the rest of the Euro Area.5 Striking a rare reso-
nance with public sentiment and positive aspirations, both the outgoing and the 
incoming presidents of the ECB stressed the need for more investment as the 
single most important action to boost the economies in the Euro Area and avoid 
a new recession. In one of his last public lectures as ECB president, Draghi em-
phasized that “the most effective response […] would be an investment-led stimu-
lus at the euro area level”.6 Adopting a similar tone in her inauguration speech 
a few weeks later, the new ECB president went further to argue in favour of 
increasing public spending on investment. Drawing a distinction between gen-
eral government spending and “productive expenditure — which, in addition to 
infrastructure, includes R&D and education”, the new ECB Chief admitted that 
productive investment had fallen as a share of overall public spending in most 
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Eurozone countries, urging that “new investment needs are emerging” Lagarde 
(2019). It remains to be seen whether such wording opens up a new era of policy 
action to restore growth or is another chapter of high moral lecturing without 
practical consequences.
5. Conclusions
U sing a simple framework of analysis, the paper demonstrated that the pro-cess of convergence in per capita GDP fi rst weakened, after the commence-
ment of the single currency, and then reversed in the event of the global fi nancial 
crisis. The only evidence of convergence is obtained after including the countries 
that joined the Euro Area during the last decade. Taking into account, however, 
that their leap onto high-growth paths is mostly explained by the policies of 
removing soviet-style rigidities and boldly adopting a series of market reforms, 
makes a repetition diffi cult to imagine. A similar opportunity is hardly realistic 
to appear again, either for the same or any other group of countries in the Euro 
Area, at least anytime soon and at the same pace and enthusiasm. A crucial fi nd-
ing among the older members of the Euro Area was that convergence dynamics 
were completely reversed leading to a polarization in the economic circumstanc-
es of the southern countries versus those of their northern most-developed peers. 
Investment differentiation was a crucial factor in generating the North-
South dichotomy before as well as after the crisis, albeit for different reasons. In 
the post-EMU era, it was the composition effect of investment toward tradeable 
and non-tradeable sectors in the Northern and Southern countries respectively. 
The different patterns quickly led to asymmetric and hugely diverging current 
accounts that subsequently necessitated the bailouts and fi scal consolidation 
programs. In the aftermath of the crisis, however, divergences appear to be siz-
able in other areas as well, such as public indebtedness, the effi ciency of institu-
tions and the intensity of investment activity as a whole. 
Therefore,  an investment plan across all the economies of the Euro Area 
seems to be the most effective policy approach in fostering growth and restoring 
convergence dynamics. The access to cheap borrowing in world markets creates 
new opportunities for fi nancing EU-wide and country-specifi c investment pro-
jects implemented by either the private or the public sector.
Future research will further investigate the links between public indebted-
ness, institutional quality and investment activity in order to establish how all 
currently diverging areas follow a more integrated pattern. To make their imple-
mentation more effective, policy priorities should be placed in the new framework 
of economic governance that is under preparation for the Euro Area.
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Notes 
1. Athens University of Economics & Business, and Hellenic Observatory, LSE. 
Email address: nchris@aueb.gr and N.Christodoulakis@lse.ac.uk
2. To facilitate comparison, both values expressed in constant 2015 prices.
3. As noted by Barrios et al. (2009) the explosion of sovereign spreads that 
sparked the crises of the European periphery occurred in countries with large 
external defi cits even if their fi scal position looked healthy. For a relevant 
discussion, see Christodoulakis (2016).
4. Slovenia was the fi rst to join in 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta in 2008, 
and Slovakia in 2009. After the global crisis, Estonia joined in 2011, Latvia in 
2014 and Lithuania in 2015.
5. Financial Times, October 20, 2019.
6. Reuters, October 1, 2019.
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